NASA Governance and Mission Focus

Current Status

Existing Law: Chapter 201 of title 51 restates the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The short title "National Aeronautics and Space Act" is provided for convenience. Additional authorization provided by P.L. 115-10 (NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017) and P.L. 117-167 (NASA Authorization Act of 2022).¹
Current Authority: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is headed by an Administrator, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under the supervision and direction of the President, the Administrator shall be responsible for the exercise of all powers and the discharge of all duties of the Administration.²
Existing Limitations: GAO designated NASA's acquisition management as high risk in 1990 in view of NASA's history of persistent cost growth and schedule delays in the majority of its major projects. GAO has identified management weaknesses that have exacerbated the inherent technical and engineering risks faced by NASA's largest projects.³ No statutory requirement for fixed-price contracting thresholds. No mandatory infrastructure maintenance funding floors. Limited authority for center specialization.

Problem

Specific Harm

Cost Overruns on Major Projects:

Cost overruns decreased from $7.6 billion in 2023 to $4.4 billion in 2024 across major projects.⁴
Artemis and Artemis-related cost overruns are an increasing proportion of the portfolio's overall overruns. Three Artemis projects account for nearly $7 billion of the total overruns—or almost half of the overruns collectively experienced by the 53 projects.⁵
The Trump administration's FY2026 budget proposal described the SLS as "grossly expensive", noting that it costs $4 billion per launch and has exceeded its budget by 140 percent.⁶
NASA will end up spending a total of $93 billion on the Artemis program between 2012 and 2025, and each SLS/Orion launch will have a price tag of about $4.1 billion.⁷

Infrastructure Deterioration:

NASA manages more than 5,000 buildings and structures, a $2.66 billion deferred maintenance backlog, and a $357 million annual facility construction budget.⁸
NASA has long had in place a policy that mandates that the maintenance and repair backlog be no greater than 2–4 percent of its infrastructure's aggregate current replacement value. The agency is currently carrying a much higher percentage—6.2 percent—because the deferred maintenance backlog has ballooned to more than $3.3 billion on an overall infrastructure CRV of $53 billion.⁹
The maintenance gap between what NASA needs to maintain or upgrade its facilities and the dollars the agency devotes to those efforts is more than $250 million per year using NASA's most conservative estimate, or more than $600 million if NASA followed the maintenance practices of the commercial industry.¹⁰

Workforce Challenges:

Recruiting and hiring skilled engineering workers has become a mission-critical challenge for NASA, an agency of 18,000 employees.¹¹
In recent years, NASA's average attrition, meaning the percentage of workers who leave the agency, has been around 6% annually. About half of that comes from retirements. Nearly 40% of the agency's science and engineering workers are age 55 and older.¹²

Who is Affected

NASA employs about 17,000 people and supports the employment of tens of thousands more through contracts and grants made in every state of the union.¹³
NASA spent 73.5% of its total budget on contracts with nearly 5,000 businesses, nonprofit organizations, and educational institutions across the United States. NASA's major contractors—Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, SpaceX, and Orbital Sciences—are the biggest recipients of NASA funding.¹⁴
59 nations are now Artemis Accords signatories whose partnership activities depend on NASA program management.¹⁵
American taxpayers and scientific community dependent on mission success.

Gaps in Current Law

No Fixed-Price Contracting Mandates: NASA's cost overruns and time delays have been blamed by some on NASA's usage of cost-plus contracts and avoidance of fixed-price contracts.¹⁶
No Infrastructure Funding Floor: No statutory requirement to fund maintenance at industry-standard levels.
No Center Specialization Requirements: A 2013 NASA Office of the Inspector General's Report recommended a Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) style organization to consolidate NASA's little used facilities. The OIG determined at least 33 of NASA's 155 facilities were underutilized.¹⁷
Limited Technology Transfer Metrics: No statutory benchmarks for commercialization outcomes.

Accountability Failures

GAO made multiple recommendations to improve NASA's management of these projects. As of April 2024, NASA had not yet fully implemented 39 GAO recommendations, including eight that GAO identified as high priority.¹⁸
In 1990, GAO listed NASA's contract management on its inaugural High Risk List. In 2009, GAO broadened its high-risk designation of NASA's contract management to acquisition management to encompass the full scope of issues that needed to be resolved – including persistent cost growth and schedule delays, antiquated financial management systems, poor cost estimating, and contract management.¹⁹
Because the original SLS version's cost and schedule commitments were tied to the launch of Artemis I, ongoing production and other costs needed to sustain the program going forward are not monitored. Instead, NASA created a rolling 5-year estimate of production and operations costs. However, neither the estimate nor the annual budget request track costs by Artemis mission or for recurring production items. As a result, the 5-year estimate and the budget requests are poor measures of cost performance over time.²⁰

Proposed Reform

Primary Policy Change

Establish a "Mission-First Contracting Framework" requiring fixed-price contracts for all development programs exceeding $500 million unless the NASA Administrator certifies in writing to GAO that a cost-plus contract is essential to national interest, with such certification subject to GAO review.

New Requirements

1. Contract Structure Reform

Programs exceeding $500 million shall use firm fixed-price (FFP) or fixed-price incentive (FPI) contracts as default
Cost-plus contracts require Administrator certification and GAO concurrence
NASA estimates that, due to the competitive approach, the Commercial Crew program is saving the agency between $20 billion and $30 billion.²¹ Codify Commercial Crew procurement model as statutory preference.

2. Infrastructure Maintenance Funding Authorization

Authorization of annual facility maintenance appropriations at recommended level of 3% of aggregate Current Replacement Value
NASA OIG shall report annually on deferred maintenance reduction progress and any shortfall below recommended levels

3. Center Specialization Framework

Administrator shall designate primary mission specializations for each field center
Cross-center duplication limited to capabilities designated as "surge capacity" or "national capability"
NASA's OCIO is spearheading the move to a One NASA enterprise model for all functions like IT traditionally handled separately by centers.²² Extend enterprise model to mission support functions.

4. Workforce Pipeline Requirements

NASA STEM programs prepare K-12 students to enter the aerospace workforce through strategic partnerships and competitive awards. NASA also promotes the development of a highly skilled workforce by funding hands-on research opportunities.²³ Authorization of STEM engagement funding at recommended level of 1% of total agency appropriations, with GAO reporting on any shortfall.
Establish direct-hire authority for critical STEM positions

5. International Partnership Framework

NASA has committed to fully use and safely operate the space station through 2030, as the agency also works to enable and seamlessly transition to commercially owned and operated platforms in low Earth orbit.²⁴ Codify ISS transition timeline.
NASA anticipates providing $1 billion to $1.5 billion in funding, from fiscal years 2026 to 2031, for the C3DO agreements, with a minimum of two awarded.²⁵ Authorize multi-year commercial LEO destination funding.

6. Technology Transfer Performance Standards

NASA's Spinoff publication highlights NASA technologies that benefit life on Earth in the form of commercial products. NASA has profiled more than 2,000 spinoffs since 1976.²⁶ Establish annual commercialization targets.
NASA generated more than $75.6 billion in economic output across all 50 states and Washington, D.C., in fiscal year 2023.²⁷ Require annual economic impact reporting.

New Prohibitions

Cost-Plus Default Prohibition: Programs exceeding $500 million may not use cost-plus contracts without Administrator certification and GAO concurrence
Baseline Manipulation Prohibition: Programs may not be "rebaselined" more than once without Congressional notification and justification
Deferred Maintenance Diversion: Infrastructure maintenance funds may not be reprogrammed to mission accounts without Congressional approval

Enforcement

GAO Enhanced Oversight Authority

Annual major project assessments (existing authority, codified)
Fixed-price waiver concurrence requirement (new authority)
Real-time cost baseline monitoring access

NASA OIG Enhanced Authority

Mandatory audit of any program exceeding 15% cost growth
Infrastructure condition assessments with remediation timelines
Workforce skills gap reporting

Judicial Conference Coordination

Contract dispute resolution expedited procedures for fixed-price disputes

Penalties

Programs exceeding 30% cost growth face mandatory re-competition or cancellation review
Contractor performance ratings linked to future NASA contract eligibility
Senior executive accountability for milestone achievement

What Changes

Before (Status Quo Dysfunction)

NASA has spent $29.0 billion on SLS development from 2011 through 2024, in nominal dollars. This is equivalent to $35.4 billion in 2025 dollars using the NASA New Start Inflation Indices.²⁸
Cost-plus contracts incentivize schedule delays
NASA's history of persistent cost growth and schedule delays in the majority of its major projects²⁹
$3.3 billion deferred maintenance backlog growing annually
39 unimplemented GAO recommendations
Center redundancies consuming resources

After (Reformed State)

Fixed-price default shifts cost risk to contractors
Fixed-priced contracts limited NASA's financial exposure. The contracts with SpaceX and Boeing remain within 3% of their original amounts³⁰ — model extended agency-wide
Infrastructure funding authorization at recommended levels with GAO shortfall reporting arrests facility deterioration
Center specialization eliminates redundant capabilities
Clear GAO concurrence requirement for cost-plus exceptions
Enhanced workforce pipeline ensures critical skills availability

ROI

Federal Budget Impact (10-Year, CBO-Scoreable)

Costs:

Item	10-Year
Infrastructure Maintenance Floor (incremental)	$2.5B
STEM Pipeline Expansion	$0.8B
Commercial LEO Destination Support	$1.5B
GAO/OIG Enhanced Oversight	$0.1B
Contingency (10%)	$0.5B
Total	$5.4B

Savings:

Item	Gross	Capture	Net
Fixed-Price Conversion Savings³¹	$15.0B	50%	$7.5B
Center Consolidation Efficiencies	$4.0B	40%	$1.6B
Reduced Cost Overruns	$8.0B	35%	$2.8B
ISS Transition to Commercial³²	$3.0B	60%	$1.8B
Total	$30.0B		$13.7B

Result: Net +$8.3B · ROI 2.5:1

Societal Benefits

Benefit	Annual	NPV (3%)	NPV (7%)
Economic Output (NASA contracts)³³	$7.6B	$65B	$53B
Technology Transfer Value³⁴	$1.5B	$13B	$10B
STEM Workforce Development	$0.5B	$4B	$3B
Total	$9.6B	$82B	$66B

Summary

Category	10-Year	Notes
Federal Budget	+$8.3B (2.5:1)	CBO-scoreable
Societal	$66B - $82B	NPV at 3-7%

Confidence: MEDIUM — Fixed-price savings estimates based on Commercial Crew program outcomes; NASA estimates the Commercial Crew program is saving the agency between $20 billion and $30 billion.³⁵ However, applicability to all programs uncertain given technical complexity variations. Infrastructure savings conservative given industry precedent. STEM benefits difficult to quantify precisely.

References

51 U.S.C. Chapter 201; P.L. 115-10 (2017); P.L. 117-167 (2022)
51 U.S.C. § 20111 (2010)
GAO, "NASA Acquisition Management," High Risk List (1990-present)
GAO-24-106767, "NASA: Assessments of Major Projects" (2024)
GAO-25-Report, "Accumulated Cost Overruns for 53 NASA Major Projects" (2025)
OMB, "FY2026 Budget Proposal – NASA" (2025)
NASA OIG, "Artemis: Costs and Challenges" (November 2021)
NASA OIG, "NASA's Construction of Facilities" (2024)
National Academies, "NASA at a Crossroads" (2024)
National Academies, "NASA at a Crossroads," Infrastructure Chapter (2024)
Aerospace America, "Advice for NASA on solving its workforce shortage" (2023)
NASA OIG, "NASA's Effort to Address Workforce Challenges" (April 2023)
The Planetary Society, "Your Guide to NASA's Budget" (2024)
The Planetary Society, "NASA Budget Data" (2024)
NASA, "Artemis Accords" (October 2025)
Wikipedia, "Budget of NASA" (2024)
NASA OIG, "Facilities Management" (2013)
GAO-24-106767, "NASA: Assessments of Major Projects" (2024)
NASA, "2024 High Risk Corrective Action Plan" (2024)
GAO-23-105609, "Space Launch System: Cost Transparency Needed" (2023)
CNBC, "NASA chief says competition is making space exploration cheaper" (May 2022)
FedScoop, "NASA looks to consolidate apps and platforms" (2022)
NASA, "About STEM Engagement at NASA" (2025)
NASA, "FAQs: The International Space Station Transition Plan" (2024)
SpaceNews, "NASA releases details on revised next phase of commercial space station development" (September 2025)
NASA, "Technology Transfer and Spinoffs" (2025)
NASA, "New Report Shows NASA's $75.6 Billion Boost to US Economy" (October 2024)
The Planetary Society, "The Cost of SLS and Orion" (2024)
GAO, "NASA Acquisition Management – High Risk" (2021)
The Planetary Society, "NASA's Commercial Crew Program is a Fantastic Deal" (2020)
Estimate based on 50% application of Commercial Crew 20-30% savings factor to applicable programs
Based on transition from $3-4B annual ISS operations to commercial service purchases
NASA FY2023 Economic Impact Report
Journal of Technology Transfer, "Measuring Economic Returns from NASA Technology Transfers" (2002)
CNBC, "NASA Commercial Crew Savings" (May 2022)

Change Log

2025-01-19 - Fiscal Flexibility: Converted mandatory funding floors (infrastructure maintenance, STEM engagement) to authorization language with recommended levels and GAO shortfall reporting. Preserves policy signal while maintaining Congressional appropriations authority. Per framework-wide fiscal automaticity audit.
2025-12-09 - Created: Initial draft. Key sources: GAO Annual NASA Assessments (2023-2025), NASA OIG Audit Reports, National Academies "NASA at a Crossroads" (2024), NASA Budget Documents (FY2024-2026), Planetary Society Budget Analysis, NASA Artemis Accords documentation.