§ Constitutional Amendment
Independent Immigration Services Agency
Current Status
Existing Law
No constitutional provision establishes an independent immigration services agency. Immigration administration falls under executive branch agencies (DHS, DOS, DOJ) subject to direct presidential control and political appointment of leadership without fixed terms or removal protections.
Current Authority
Immigration judges serve at the pleasure of the Attorney General under DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), creating structural conflicts where prosecutors and judges operate within the same chain of command. Supreme Court precedent (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018) affirms broad executive discretion over immigration policy implementation.¹
Existing Limitations
No constitutional protection exists for judicial independence in immigration proceedings. EOIR faces longstanding workforce management challenges without a strategic workforce plan since 2013.² Broad executive discretion enables rapid policy reversals with each administration.
Problem
Specific Harm
Immigration court backlog reached 3.6 million pending cases at the end of FY2024.³ EOIR received nearly 1.8 million new cases in FY2024 alone—a record level for the third consecutive year.⁴ Despite nearly tripling judicial staff from 254 judges in FY2015 to 735 judges in FY2024, completions cannot keep pace with new filings.⁵
Who is Affected
Over 3.4 million individuals with pending immigration cases, of whom 59% (approximately 2 million) are navigating proceedings without legal representation.⁶ 75% of people ordered removed in the past 12 months lacked legal representation.⁷ Businesses unable to plan workforce needs under unpredictable immigration system.
Gaps in Current Law
No mechanism separates immigration administration from four-year political cycles. No protection exists for judicial independence in immigration proceedings. Immigration judges within DOJ face structural conflicts where prosecutors and judges operate within same chain of command. GAO has repeatedly found EOIR lacks strategic workforce planning.⁸
Accountability Failures
Congress appropriates funds and establishes immigration law but cannot ensure consistent implementation. EOIR has not had an agency-wide strategic plan since 2013.⁹ Structural conflict where prosecutors and judges operate within same chain of command compromises fair adjudication.
Proposed Reform
Primary Policy Change
Establish constitutionally independent Immigration Services Agency governed by seven-member Board of Governors with staggered ten-year terms, removable only for cause (neglect of duty, malfeasance, or incapacity). No more than four members shall be of the same political party.
New Requirements
- Board members must possess demonstrated expertise in immigration policy, law, economics, national security, or humanitarian affairs
- Board shall establish immigration quotas within parameters set by Congress, adjusting annually based on labor market indicators, processing capacity, and demographic analysis
- Agency shall submit annual reports to Congress detailing admissions, processing times, outcomes by category, and recommendations for legislative changes
- Immigration judges shall be appointed by the Board of Governors and serve fifteen-year terms with adequate support staff
- Information-sharing protocols between Agency and enforcement division shall be established by law
New Prohibitions
- Immigration judges removable only for misconduct as established by law, not for policy disagreements
- Immigration enforcement functions shall remain separate from the Immigration Services Agency to ensure impartial adjudication
- Board members may not be removed except for neglect of duty, malfeasance, or incapacity
Enforcement
Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation. Congressional oversight maintained through appropriations authority, legislative parameter-setting for quotas and admission standards, and annual reporting requirements.
What Changes
| Aspect | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Agency Leadership | Political appointees serving at presidential pleasure | Independent Board with ten-year staggered terms, removable only for cause |
| Immigration Judges | Within DOJ subject to Attorney General authority | 15-year terms with protection from political removal |
| Policy Stability | Subject to administration reversals | Stable implementation within congressional parameters |
| Quota Adjustment | Subject to political considerations | Evidence-based adjustments using labor market data |
| Democratic Accountability | Direct executive control | Congressional oversight through appropriations and legislative parameters |
| Strategic Planning | No agency-wide strategic plan since 2013 | Independent board establishes multi-year workforce and operational plans |
ROI
Federal Budget Impact (10-Year, Estimated)
Note: Constitutional amendments are not CBO-scoreable. Estimates based on comparable programs, research, and implementing legislation projections.
Costs:
| Item | 10-Year | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Independent Board of Governors (7 members + staff) | $0.05B | Est. comparable to independent agency boards |
| Immigration Judge Team Expansion (additional 375+ teams at ~$1M/team/yr) | $5.0B | ¹ |
| Agency Transition/Restructuring | $1.0B | Est. based on court restructuring complexity |
| Technology Modernization | $0.3B | ² |
| Contingency (15%) | $0.95B | |
| Total | $7.3B |
Savings:
| Item | Gross | Capture | Net | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reduced Detention Costs (faster adjudication) | $20.0B | 20% | $4.0B | ³ |
| Reduced Appeals/Remands (judicial independence) | $0.5B | 30% | $0.15B | Est. |
| Improved Tax Compliance (timely status resolution) | $2.0B | 25% | $0.5B | ⁴ |
| Total | $22.5B | $4.65B |
Result: Net -$2.65B (Estimated - Not CBO-Scoreable)
Societal Benefits
| Benefit | Annual | NPV (3%) | NPV (7%) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP Contribution (efficient processing enables immigrant economic participation from $8.9T projected surge) | $89.0B | $758.5B | $625.0B | ⁵ |
| Tax Revenue Enhancement (immigrants in surge pay additional $1.2T in federal revenues over decade) | $12.0B | $102.3B | $84.3B | ⁵ |
| Deficit Reduction (immigration surge lowers deficits by $0.9 trillion over 2024-2034) | $9.0B | $76.7B | $63.2B | ⁶ |
| Improved Outcomes via Representation (only 26.9% with representation ordered removed vs. 61.8% without) | $1.5B | $12.8B | $10.5B | ⁷ |
| Reduced Case Processing Time (economic productivity from resolved status) | $5.0B | $42.6B | $35.1B | Est. |
| Total | $116.5B | $992.9B | $818.1B |
Summary
| Category | 10-Year | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Federal Budget | -$2.65B | Estimated - Not CBO-scoreable; upfront investment |
| Societal | $818B - $993B | NPV at 3-7%; captures portion of $8.9T GDP boost |
Confidence: MEDIUM
Estimation Basis: Congress appropriated $3.43 billion for immigration detention alone in FY 2024, compared to just $840 million for the entire immigration court system. Detention costs average $152 per day per individual, while alternatives to detention programs with case management achieve over 95% court appearance rates at costs of $5-6 per person per day. BPC research found adding 100 judges in 2014 would have cost $109 million but saved $823 million in detention costs, suggesting positive ROI from judicial expansion. Primary societal benefits derive from CBO's projection that the immigration surge boosts total nominal GDP by $8.9 trillion over 2024-2034, with independent courts potentially capturing greater economic value through efficient, stable case resolution. Cost estimates based on proposed EOIR funding increases of $1.3 billion (30% annual budget increase) and FY2025 budget requests for 375 new immigration judge teams.
Key Research Findings:
The estimated cost for an immigration judge team is approximately $1.0 million annually, according to Federal Bar Association analysis.
The pending cases backlog in immigration courts has grown each year since FY2006, exceeding 1 million for the first time in FY2019, reaching nearly 2.5 million at end of FY2023, and approximately 3.6 million at end of FY2024.
Applicants represented by legal counsel were granted asylum at rates 3.1 times (affirmative) and 1.8 times (defensive) higher than unrepresented applicants, according to GAO.
Both detained and nondetained immigrants with legal counsel had higher success rates, with representation associated with a 19 to 43 percentage point boost in case success. Detained immigrants with representation were ten-and-a-half times more likely to succeed.
Opponents of the current courts structure contend that courts are subject to politicization under the political leadership of a law enforcement agency within the executive branch. Many stakeholders have advocated for a courts system independent of the executive branch under Article I. Some proponents believe such a change would help alleviate the backlog. Others believe restructuring would be costly and would not effectively solve the immediate problem of the backlog.
References
Needs references - to be added in future update
Change Log
- 2025-12-13 - ROI Research: Added researched ROI estimates via Opus 4.5 batch process
Date Change Source 2025-12-08 Amendment standardization: ROI set to TBD pending CBO scoring; removed unsubstantiated figures Batch processor 2025-12-08 Standardized to legislation template format Batch standardization 2025-12-08 Removed unsubstantiated claims; added CRS, GAO, Vera citations Deep research pass